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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Current  practices  in  intensive  animal  production  increasingly  raise  questions  with  respect  to  animal
ethics  both  among  the public  in  Europe  and  in  political  circles.  This  paper  integrates  three  areas  of  philo-
sophical  views  in  order  to formulate  a general  ethical  position  with  respect  to animal  husbandry.  The ﬁrst
area  regards  the  question  to what  type  of  beings  animals  are.  Secondly,  an  evaluative  model  of  agrarian
practices  is  employed  in  order  to  obtain  a better  perception  on  the  place  of animals  in  animal  husbandry.
In  these  two  lines  of  thinking,  reformational  philosophy  from  the  school  of Dooyeweerd  is  explicitly
employed.  In  the  third  view,  current  thinking  regarding  normative  ethics,  in  general,  and  animal  ethics,
in  particular,  is  utilized  to elaborate  on  the  ethical  aspect  of  the  practice  of  animal  husbandry.  It is arguedgrarian practice
eformational philosophy
ooyeweerd
nimal welfare
ntrinsic value
hronèsis
that  the  major  ethical  principles  for evaluating  the manner  in  which  animals  are  cared  for  and  treated  in
animal  husbandry  are  the  concepts  of the  ‘intrinsic  value’  of  animals,  animal  welfare,  and  the  principle  of
care, the  latter  being  the  core  principle  of  the ethical  aspect.  On  the  basis  of  the  literature,  these  three  con-
cepts are  elaborated  consistent  with  reformational  philosophy.  This  leads  to  an  integrated  interpretation
of  an  ethically  correct  practice  of  animal  husbandry.
© 2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.The just knows the soul of his animal [1]
Bible, Proverbs 12:10
. Introduction
There is an ongoing debate within Dutch society–as well as
n other European countries–on the manner in which modern
ndustrial societies deal with animals, especially in agriculture
2,3]. Reports emphasize that major segments of the intensive ani-
al  husbandry in the Netherlands, as in many other European
ountries, are ethically irresponsible, to say the least [4–7]. Mean-
hile, systematic reﬂection on ethically acceptable ways of keeping
nimals has continued, and new methods of keeping animals are
eing implemented in agrarian practice [8–11]. The agro-industry
lso demonstrates an awareness that things will have to change
12]. In the Netherlands, the changing attitudes and opinions within
ociety toward the way animals are treated also found expression
n a new law, the Dutch Animals Act (Wet Dieren) [13]. Mean-
hile, the ethical debate surrounding animal ethics has continued
s well [14–23]. In this contribution to this special issue of NJAS I
ill present a speciﬁc philosophical approach to animal husbandry
n which scientiﬁc data and insights regarding animal welfare in
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +0317 483637/0655771162; fax: +031785453.
E-mail address: Henk.jochemsen@wur.nl
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2013.05.011 All rights reserved.
animal husbandry will be integrated with philosophical and ethi-
cal theory in order to formulate a normative perspective on animal
husbandry. This will lead to the conclusion that keeping animals
as such can be ethically acceptable, but that substantial parts of
predominant and current intensive animal production systems are
ethically unacceptable.
I will brieﬂy present a normative view on animals following
some general methodical observations. Subsequently, an earlier
developed model of agriculture will be applied to practices of ani-
mal  husbandry. In dialogue with current literature on animal ethics,
these two models will be elaborated into brieﬂy presented theo-
ries on the intrinsic value of animals, on animal welfare, and on the
principle of care and related virtues. The paper concludes with a
summary of the insights gained regarding an ethically justiﬁable
animal husbandry.
2. Ethics and practice
A reﬂection on ethically sound animal husbandry culminates
from several areas of scholarship. The ﬁrst area is that of ethics
being the systematic reﬂection on human behavior from the
perception of right and wrong, of ought and ought not. This
discipline has generated a series of approaches, theories, and
principles that people should adhere to in order to realize ethically
correct behavior. However, there must be a correlation between
the results of ethical reﬂection itself and the implementation in
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
5  Journal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 55– 63
p
i
c
f
i
e
s
T
i
g
o
p
o
o
o
a
o
r
e
h
o
e
j
3
m
H
r
c
s
b
w
t
w
p
[
w
u
d
w
p
i
a
s
s
o
d
t
t
t
p
e
b
r
t
a
w
Box 1: Information and main characteristics of Refor-
mational Philosophy
• Reformational Philosophy is the name for the school of phi-
losophy that, between World War I and II, was developed
by Herman Dooyeweerd in collaboration with Dirk H.Th.
Vollenhoven at the Free University (now VU University) in
Amsterdam.
• Human reason is not autonomous but, like all other human
faculties, is rooted in and informed by a fundamental view of
reality, i.e. a world view. This does not deny the importance
of observations and inter-subjectivity in life, in particular, in
science.
• Reality harbors structures that have a normative character
in the sense that they should be taken into consideration for
the ﬂourishing of human beings in their natural and social
environments (e.g. human ﬂourishing requires not only cer-
tain food but also certain psychological and social conditions,
etc.).
• In reality, a number of irreducible modal aspects can be
distinguished which demonstrate a normative pluralism in
reality and imply the rejection of any form of reductionism in
which all of reality is ultimately reduced to one aspect such
as physical, psychical or social.
• The modal aspects are numerical, spatial, kinematic, physi-
cal, biotic, sensitive, analytical, formative, linguistic, social,
economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical and ﬁduciary (faith as
a function).
• These modal aspects are also normative perspectives; all
things including social entities function in all of these
aspects, and they will ﬂourish if all of the normative aspects6 H. Jochemsen / NJAS - Wageningen
ractices. Such an implementation invariably involves a certain
nterpretation of both the theories and principles to be applied in a
oncrete situation, as well as the situation itself. This treatise starts
rom the presupposition that the situation in which an action
s performed is not ethically and normatively ‘neutral’ but that
very actual situation already harbors normativity.1 People have
haped practices in pursuing the realization of values in their lives.
hese established practices embody those values. The normativity
nherent in those practices should be recognized, observed and
iven shape during changing circumstances, leading to a variety
f practice performances. The variation is due to the fact that
ractices are always guided by the perception of the practitioner
n what constitutes a good practice. I call this the ‘directional side’
f practices, which I will discuss later in this paper. This reﬂection
n normative practices constitutes the second area of study.
The third area that will inform the reﬂection on ethically sound
nimal husbandry is animal ethics in a narrow sense of reﬂecting
n the status of animals and human responsibility toward them.
In this paper, I will discuss these three areas of thinking in the
everse order. Following a general section on animals and animal
thics, I will present a normative view of the practice of animal
usbandry that provides the content for a reﬂection on the question
f how to deal with animals in that context. This analysis brieﬂy
xploits normative ethical theories, leading to the formulation and
ustiﬁcation of key principles in animal ethics.
. Animals and what are due to them
In this paper, I employ the philosophy currently known as Refor-
ational, or also Christian, Philosophy of the Dutch philosopher
erman Dooyeweerd.2 In my  perspective, this philosophy incorpo-
ates certain characteristics that make it suitable for investigating
omplex ethical issues in which a variety of normative perspectives
hould be observed (see Box 1), which is the case with animal hus-
andry. I agree with recent criticism that a signiﬁcant part of early
riting concerning animal ethics were too monistic in the sense
hat the authors attempted to identify a single, essential trait in
hich the moral status of animals can be grounded and that would
rovide an overriding ethical principle for dealing with animals
24,25].
In our dealings with certain types of things or entities in the
orld we must consider both the speciﬁc character of the entity
nder study as well as the speciﬁc contexts in which we  are
ealing with them. For the former, I will exploit a model of Dooye-
eerd; the latter will be accounted for in the section of agrarian
ractices.
Dooyeweerd distinguishes, in living organisms, a number of
ntertwined substructures of the organism that, in the organism
s a whole, form an integrated and coherent unity [26,27]. Sub-
tructures in this model do not refer to physically recognizable
ubsystems or segments but rather represent some of the modes
f being or modal aspects that, in Dooyeweerdian Philosophy, are
istinguished in reality. In all organisms, at least two substruc-
ures can be distinguished. The ﬁrst is the physicochemical, i.e.,
he molecules of which the body is constructed. In this substruc-
ure that forms the substrate for higher substructures, the laws of
hysics and chemistry are applicable.
1 The term normativity has a meaning that is broader than ethics. In addition to
thical normativity meaning the whole of ethical notions that should guide human
ehavior principles, we can speak of logical normativity, meaning the norms and
ules that guide sound logical reasoning. Other forms of normativity are psychical,
echnical, social, lingual, economic, and juridical. This is discussed in the main text.
2 For some main characteristics of reformational philosophy, see Box 1, and for
 short introduction into Dooyeweerd’s thinking and further literature, see also
ww.freewebs.com/reformationalphilosophy/are simultaneously observed.
The second substructure of all living organisms is the biotic
substructure, i.e. the expression of the mode of being that quali-
ﬁes micro-organisms and plants. Animals, and also mankind, share
these two  structures with all other living organisms. However,
in animals, a third substructure, the sensitive substructure, can
be distinguished. This highest and qualifying substructure in ani-
mals guides and unfolds the functioning of lower substructures. In
other words, the sensitive substructure (which, in human beings,
corresponds to the psychic substructure) informs form and func-
tion of the lower levels. For example, the functioning of animal
cells and tissues is also determined by the living conditions and
environment of the animal in their entirety [28,29]. The sensitive
substructure discovers its regulating center in the central nervous
system (CNS) of the animal. Hence, animals, e.g. husbandry animals,
can be described as an intertwined coherent whole of three sub-
structures that manifest the physical, the biotic, and the sensitive
modal aspect of reality.
In the human being, a fourth substructure can be observed, the
so-called normative act-structure that qualiﬁes and unfolds the
previously mentioned substructures. This act-structure manifests
itself in a diversity of acts (including acts of the mind and will)
that are subjèct to a variety of normative principles [30]. This act-
structure that forms an integrated and coherent whole with the
other substructures is centered in the human Self. This Self, the uni-
fying root of the human being, is spiritually qualiﬁed in the sense
that, through Self, the human being in its full bodily existence is
orientated toward that which it considers as ‘unconditionally non–
dependent reality’ [31]. Due to the spiritual qualiﬁcation of the
human being, a qualitative distinction is observed between human
beings and animals. This requires additional explanation. Refor-
mational Philosophy starts from the perspective that, in reality,
normative structures are operative. Since in reality forces of disor-
der are also effective, the normative structures must be disclosed
 Journal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 55– 63 57
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Dire ction  of  corr ect performa nce 
sessed a herd of sheep [44]. In itself, an historic observation does not
support a moral claim. However, in accordance with the authors
referred to above, the keeping of animals can be interpreted as a
3 MacIntyre deﬁnes: “By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any and complex formH. Jochemsen / NJAS - Wageningen
y careful observation and analysis of reality and the regularities
hat sustain and promote the ﬂourishing of segments in reality,
.g. ecosystems, and of entities such as plants, animals and human
eings, both at an individual and a community level. The underly-
ng normative structures deﬁne the identity of entities that is basic for
heir moral status.
In  this respect, the implication of the above-stated analysis of
iving organisms is that the species-identity of an organism resides
n the constancy and continuity in time of the structuralization
f the individual in the various substructures described above
32]. The actual individual identity of an organism depends on the
pecies-identity - the individual belongs to a species - but consti-
utes a unique realization of each of the substructures (the only
xception being the identical genotype of clones). This signiﬁes that
uman beings are invariably an instantiation of the species iden-
ity of human beings no matter the level of actual expression of
apacities that are ‘normally’ characteristic for human beings at a
ertain age and stage of development. The same applies to animals.
his view implies that human beings, while alive, in whatever state,
ave a qualitatively higher status than any animal. Obviously this
ualitative difference between humans and animals will play a role
n my  ethical reﬂection on how to deal with animals. In contrast,
eter Singer only considers the identity and the actual capaci-
ies of individual beings and observes -in itself, correctly- that, in
hat respect, some animals manifest greater capacities than certain
uman beings [33]. He does not take into consideration the nor-
ative species-speciﬁc structuralization of individual beings and
he corresponding status. Ultimately, the different views reside in
ifferent world views.
Their sensitive qualiﬁcation gives animals a higher ethical status
han plants that are biotically qualiﬁed. The central value of the sen-
itive aspect and, therefore, of the sensitive substructure, is feeling.
he fact that they are able to feel and, as a consequence, suffer in cer-
ain ways is an important characteristic of animals. In the sensitive
ubstructure, the CNS fulﬁls a central role. It is both the anatom-
cal precondition for feeling and the precondition of ‘inwardness’,
nother characteristic of animals that has been speciﬁed by the
amous zoologist Adolf Portmann. In this respect, he intended to
ndicate that living organisms are always centers of activity and
utonomously acting beings that relate actively to their environ-
ent even in activities that go beyond those necessary for sheer
urvival [35,36]. Organisms seem to demonstrate a purpose, a ‘will’
n the manner that they relate to their environment.
In the literature regarding animal ethics, authors refer to these
wo characteristics of animals as the basis for the animals’ status.
eter Singer argued that the capacity to suffer is a determinant
or the status of animals and for what human beings can do with
hem. He argues for the application of the principle of equal con-
ideration that requires that we (in some signiﬁcant way) place
qual moral weight on comparable interests regardless of who
olds those interests. According to Singer, this does not necessarily
ignify equal treatment to all who have those interests; the treat-
ent also depends on the circumstances [33]. Tom Regan, on the
ther hand, argued that animals characterize themselves by being
 ‘subject-of-life’ and, therefore, should be respected. He defends
hat animals should receive the same respect as human beings or at
east to the degree that every form of animal husbandry is ethically
bjectionable [15,34]. In my  view, Singer and Regan mistakenly
ake an absolute of the one characteristic of animals that they iden-
ify as typical and fail to take into account that the animal–mankind
elationship is embedded in a variety of different practices in which
any more aspects and values play a role than just the observationhat animals can feel or that they are subjects-of-a-life, i.e. have
nwardness [37,38]. The next section will present a perspective
n practices and their meaning for our beliefs toward responsible
uman action toward animals.: Ref lection on corre ct perfo rman ce
Fig. 1. Model of normative practice.
4. An evaluative model of agrarian practices
4.1. A theoretical model
In this analysis, I will employ the theoretical model of (pro-
fessional) practices as developed elsewhere [39]. Fig. 1 depicts a
presentation of the general characteristics of the model. In the fol-
lowing, I will provide just a short description of the model for the
agrarian practice as described more extensively earlier [40].
The ﬁrst step in the analysis is the distinction between ‘structure’
and ‘direction’ [41]. Structure refers to the constellation of princi-
ples and norms that characterize the social structure under study
and that should be observed in order to make the practice ﬂour-
ish. Direction, on the other hand, refers to the beliefs that guide the
interpretation and implementation of those principles and norms
in the actual functioning of a social structure in a historical situa-
tion. The analysis will begin with the structure of agrarian practice
whereby the Dooyeweerdian approach of social structures, begin-
ning with the identiﬁcation of the qualifying aspect and of the main
foundational aspect, will be followed.
4.2. Structure of agrarian practice
Practices are understood as social structures that embody a
coherent form of socially established cooperative human activity. 3
Such a structure exists for a reason, its telos. Practices surge in his-
tory and are established in order to realize a certain value that
is appreciated within society. In this analysis of the practice of
animal husbandry, I want to start from the anthropological obser-
vation that, beginning in early history, human communities have
involved animals [42,43]. In the biblical narrative of early human
history, this is expressed in the story of Abel, a son of the ﬁrst
human couple Adam and Eve, who  had already, at that time, pos-of  socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to
that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially deﬁnitive of, that form of activity,
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions
of  the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended"[54, p.187]
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ay of dealing with the experience that human communities often
ound themselves in situations of scarcity and have recurred to
unting animals in nature or to keeping animals for sustenance.
hese were often animals that, in their natural habitat, were vul-
erable for suffering hardship from natural conditions or being
illed by predators. In a sense, the keeping animals, such as sheep,
ould be interpreted as an exchange of interests; care and pro-
ection for the animals in exchange for their ‘products’ like milk,
ool and, sometimes, meat. Furthermore, many races and vari-
ties of animals in the present animal husbandry would have a
ery difﬁcult life in the ‘wild’ without that care. This historical
pproach ﬁnds a principal ethical support from the observation of
he qualitative difference between human beings and animals as
xplained above. In this aspect, the earlier mentioned concept of
isorder in reality is manifested in the scarcity for humans and ani-
als; the use and consumption of animals is an adaptation to that
ituation.
This account of the practice of animal husbandry already indi-
ates its purpose, its telos, speciﬁcally, providing food and ﬁber for
uman consumption. The telos of a practice correlates to what is
ndicated as the typical or qualifying aspect. The primary process,
he very activities of which the practice consists, correlates to what
s indicated as the foundational aspect of the practice.
.3. Qualifying aspect
The agrarian practice is comprised of human interventions and
ctivities with the intent of harvesting vegetal and animal produce
o provide for the human needs of food and ﬁber. However, in
hese practices, such dealings with living nature are not goals in
hemselves.4 In agrarian practice, the purpose of formative human
ctions are to nudge natural processes toward agrarian production
hat can be harvested and, therefore, support the lives of people
nd the community. In other words, agrarian practice as a social
tructure entails the efﬁcient utilization of a variety of resources,
iz. labor, land, and other natural and technical means in the pro-
ess of bringing forth food and ﬁber. This denotes that agrarian
ractice, as a whole, in its organizational manifestation is to be
erceived as an enterprise, otherwise commonly speciﬁed as a
arm [46,48,49].
The normative principle of the economic aspect is efﬁcient man-
gement of (scarce) resources. Others speak of ‘frugal management’
n which frugal can be deﬁned as ‘avoiding waste’ [50]. A question
hat arises is: how should ‘efﬁcient management’ in the context of
he practice of animal husbandry be understood? Modern indus-
rial agriculture is very much oriented toward effective and efﬁcient
roduction, at least in the relatively short term [51,52]. Does this
ean that this version of agrarian practice responds best to the nor-
ative structure of that practice? Before attempting to answer this
uestion, I will discuss the major foundational aspects and a few
ther modal aspects that provide normative principles for agrarian
ractice.
.4. Foundational aspects
In agrarian practice, the human being works with living nature
s a ‘production factor’ toward the survival and health of human
eings. The ‘raw materials’ for these activities include the soil,
lants and animals in the state they are found in nature. Hence, the
iotic aspect is foundational for agrarian practice in the sense that
iving nature forms a precondition for it. The normative principle
4 Maybe the latter could be said of a practice of breeding, e.g. new races of dogs for
fun’.  In this aspect, the breeding activity is not just deﬁning the activities of which
he practice consists, it also provides the reason of its existence.l of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 55– 63
of the biotic aspect is ‘life’. Observing this principle implies that, in
its incredible diversity, life as a typical, irreducible phenomenon
in reality should be handled respectfully. In animal husbandry,
the life and needs of animals are a precondition for that type of
agrarian practice. This signiﬁes that, in addition to the biotic, the
sensitive aspect with ‘feeling’ as its normative principle is also foun-
dational for animal husbandry (cf. above). As a consequence, the
typical characteristics of animals, viz., that they exhibit the capac-
ity for ‘feeling’ and demonstrate ‘inwardness’ should be taken into
consideration. These normative principles are a priori principles
that do not provide immediate directives for action but should
be concretized in the context of practices as will be elaborated
below.
However, living nature as such is not typical for the activities in
which agrarian practice is involved. Nature constitutes a necessary
precondition, but the practice of agriculture is invariably associated
with human interventions in nature [45]. Agrarian practices employ
techniques and methods that, over the course of history, have been
developed by people to guide natural processes in the direction of
producing desired food and ﬁber. This denotes that the historical-
technical aspect, also indicated as the formative aspect, should be
perceived as the leading foundational aspect for the cooperative
activity that forms agrarian practices [46,p.59]. This implies that
the normative principle of that aspect, deliberate shaping or, as oth-
ers argue, ‘meaning-oriented shaping’, is also a leading normative
principle of that practice [47]. To better understand its implication
for agrarian practice, a more thorough investigation is required into
this aspect and its normative principle. The understanding of the
formative aspect in Dooyeweerdian Philosophy is very broad; it
applies to all types of human activity that shape any physical or
social entity. The practice of education (of people) is also consid-
ered to be qualiﬁed by this aspect, and that practice clearly is not
characterized by ‘making’ in any technical sense [57].
In-depth observations will clarify that, in agrarian practice, ‘pro-
duction’ is not the same as, for example, in the practice of producing
cell phones even though the two practices have the same basic nor-
mative structure, speciﬁcally, one founded in the formative aspect
and qualiﬁed by the economic aspect. Agriculture is not a type of
‘making’, in the common sense. It is impossible to ‘make’ a crop or
‘make’ an animal grow or produce milk or meat. We  can only facil-
itate the natural processes involved. Hence, in agrarian practice,
the shaping activities possess a character of ‘tilling and guarding’
[58] the earth rather than of ‘making’ in a goal-oriented, techni-
cal manner. In agrarian practice, humans deal with living nature
in a way  that demonstrates meaning-oriented shaping of biolog-
ical organisms and processes leading to agrarian production by,
for example, adding manure to the soil, sowing or planting crops,
pulling weeds, feeding the goats, or caring for pregnant animals
and their young, etc. Good care for the soil, plants and animals
will result in effective and efﬁcient harvests in the long run. We
could state that our primary responsibility toward nature is to not
destroy the very basis for the production of food that is the natural
capacity of nature, speciﬁcally, the soil and living organisms. This
is not to suggest that interventions in nature are inherently prob-
lematic. In my  view, nature is not sacred. Interventions are not only
allowed but are desirable, to a certain extent, since, from the per-
spective of human nutritional needs, nature is not just benevolent
but exhibits a resistance that requires human interventions for cul-
tivating, ﬁghting plagues, drought etc. This is why  I do not agree,
for example, with Regan and Visak, that animals possess a moral
status that would, in every form, be incompatible with keeping and
killing animals for food [34,56]. However, in light of our enormous
technical power to intervene and the tremendous ambition of our
modern culture for economic efﬁciency and ﬁnancial gain, I want
to stress the signiﬁcance of care and carefulness in the formative
activities in agrarian practice [21].
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.5. Other normative principles
Apart from subsistence farming, an agrarian practice organized
s a farm is not an isolated unit but is embedded in other networks
n the society on which it depends. Farmers need to buy or rent
and, perhaps require certain buildings such as barns for animals,
hey may  have to procure a loan from a bank, arrange property
ights, buy materials such as equipment and seeds in order to
ractice farming, etc. They must comply with regulations regarding
he chemicals that are allowed and/or obtainable. They must deal
ith price regulations or a market that may  be unstable, both for
he things they need to buy and for their own products. Addition-
lly, of course, they would also like to sell (part of) their products.
hese activities generally possess a primarily economic character
cf. the economic qualiﬁcation of the practice), but they are often
egally regulated and occur in a variety of social interactions. Hence,
he primary process not only has to comply with the formative
technical) and qualifying (economic) principles but also with the
rinciples related to the other modal aspects of reality. In addition
o the biotic and sensitive aspects mentioned above are others such
s the lingual aspect, the normative principle of which requires
lear information and communication with all stakeholders; the
ocial aspect related to respect for social relations and societal
cceptance; the juridical aspect pertaining to respecting laws and
egulations; and the ethical aspect that will be discussed below
53]. The well-functioning of the practice requires that it simulta-
eously observes a constellation of, among others, the normative
rinciples related to the aspects mentioned above. These various
ormative aspects are represented by different institutions and
rganizations that form the broader context of agrarian practice
uch as the state, the media, other actors in the food chain, and con-
umer organizations, among others. Otherwise stated, the practice
s embedded in a broader context of which it is dependent and
o which it contributes. The way in which a farmer achieves the
imultaneous realization of principles in the actual performance
f his practice will depend on his broader normative perception
f reality and of the character and meaning of his practice, i.e. the
irectional side of the practice.
.6. Directional side
The structural side of a practice, as brieﬂy described above,
mbodies the normative principles and rules that should guide
he performance of the practice and provide the norms required
o assess that performance. However, any performance and
ssessment involves a speciﬁc interpretation of the rules (cf. the
nterpretation of a piece of music in a particular performance). Such
n interpretation occurs within a broader interpretative framework
egarding the meaning of that practice for human life and for soci-
ty and, hence, on the direction performances of that practice. What
 call ‘the directional side’, is related to what certain authors on
nimal ethics refer to as a ‘pre-given order’ that appears to inﬂu-
nce positions on the status of and responsibilities toward animals
37]. There is no ‘neutral’ performance of a practice. Additionally,
ne’s understanding of the virtues required to competently per-
orm practices depends on a broader view of the telos of human life
54,pp.185-187]. The beliefs pertaining to the directional side also
onstitute the reference points for a critical assessment of existing
ays of performing practices by practitioners and of innovation and
mprovement of practices. Without this explicitly critical function
f the directional side, the concept of normative practices easily
ortrays a conservative and self-referential character.The beliefs and ideas that regulate the performance of practices
hould be open for debate. This is particularly signiﬁcant in our
luralist society in which it is likely that, at this level, fundamen-
al differences exist in our society regarding agriculture, in general,l of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 55– 63 59
and the position of animal husbandry in current food production,
in particular. For example, the model of high input industrial agri-
culture consists of very different ideas about the manner in which
a farmer should interact with nature than does the model of agro
ecology [55]. A crucial question in the context of animal husbandry
is to what extent animal production provides an essential contri-
bution to the food and nutrition security of mankind or, at least,
of certain groups of people. From the perspective of sustainability
and the growing world population, some deny any legitimacy for
keeping animals for human food production [56].
It is evident that answers to such questions will always contain a
world view background. It is beyond the scope of this paper to con-
tribute to this debate; therefore, I will make only two  observations.
At the level of questioning the justiﬁability of (intensive) animal
husbandry at all, the issues of global sustainability and global jus-
tice should be taken into consideration. At the level of the practices
of keeping animals, I hold the position that human life represents a
quality of existence that justiﬁes a certain degree of instrumental-
ization of nature, including animals. However, animals possess an
intrinsic value and, hence, are more than just production factors.
This assertion corresponds to the earlier normative observation
that, in agrarian practices, the formative activities should demon-
strate care and carefulness.
This concept of care brings us to the normative aspect that is
crucial in this treatise on the ethics of animal husbandry, i.e. the
ethical aspect. What does an ethical reﬂection mean for the norms,
values, and virtues that should be observed in agrarian practices?
In my  answer, I combine reformational philosophy with general
ethical theory.
4.7. Ethics and responsibility
In Reformational Philosophy, the normative principle of the
ethical aspect is care. In this aspect, care is deﬁned as the nor-
mative attitude that considers the (well-being of the) other as
not just instrumentally, but also intrinsically, valuable [59]. In this
instance, I employ the word ‘intrinsic’ as deﬁned by Meijboom [60].
Hence, animal husbandry should deal with animals in a manner that
demonstrates respect for their intrinsic value. This signiﬁes that
animals should be cared for in order to maintain a certain degree
of well-being, or welfare, for the animals. In elaborating this gen-
eral ethical insight, I exploit common normative ethical theories.
In almost all introductions in (normative) ethics, three (families of)
normative ethical perspectives, or theories, are presented in some
way or another [14,ch.3]. Duty ethics (deontology) evaluates behav-
ior in regard to principles and rules that apply in the particular
situation and deﬁne the duty of the actor, i.e. the practitioner. In
reference to animal husbandry, the main ethical question is what it
means to attribute animals also with an intrinsic value when keep-
ing them. (Of course, granted that we may  keep animals at all for
human food production, cf. above). This requires a view of animals
in relationship to human beings.
Goal ethics (teleology, consequentialism, utilitarianism) eval-
uate behavior concerning the goals that certain actions or ways
of behaving pursue; in other words, the expected value (conse-
quences, utility) that is to be realized. The concept of the telos, the
ﬁnality of the practice, relates the model of practices to this ethi-
cal perspective. For animal husbandry, the ethical dilemma, in this
instance, is how the way we  keep and treat animals for human
use relates to the general principle of care for animal welfare as
explained above. This requires a theory of animal welfare. The ethi-
cal theory that focuses on the person whose acting is considered, i.c.
the farmer, is virtue ethics. This ethical theory evaluates behavior
in regard to whether the required virtues have been demonstrated
in the speciﬁc situation. In other words, what virtues reﬂect the
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asic attitude of care in animal husbandry? This requires a view of
he principle of care and the related virtues.
From my  perspective, each one of those (families of) ethical
heories has validity but is, at the same time, limited. In certain sit-
ations, one approach will appear as most prominent and, in other
ituations, another. I propose an integration of the three perspec-
ives and theories at the level of the practitioner in the concept of
esponsibility. In human action, the agent is responsible and should
e ready to provide an account of his moral conduct (virtue ethics)
oncerning the responsibilities for a certain state of affairs (tele-
logy), e.g. a farmer who is ‘responsible’ for the (quality of) milk
he cow produces for human consumption). In addition, the action
hould correspond with the principles and norms (including exist-
ng legislation) that apply in that particular situation (deontology).
ompetent performance of practices, including those in farming,
equires the integration of a variety of normative aspects and of
thical perspectives that cannot be reduced to a straightforward
pplication of ethical principles. The practitioner should be given
he freedom to make decisions and act on the basis of the outcome
f a process by weighing the available knowledge and a diversity of
ormative occurrences. This requires the virtue of phronèsis, i.e.
ractical wisdom.5 For a thorough understanding of the perfor-
ance of practices as meant in this instance, a discussion regarding
hronèsis is required.
In the remainder of this paper, I will present brief sketches of the
our theories that are required in order to obtain an understanding
f ethically justiﬁable animal husbandry.
. Animal ethics in animal husbandry
.1. View of animals
In the former section, it was stated that a deontological perspec-
ive on animal husbandry requires an understanding of animals to
e able to do justice to them in the sense of caring for them. Below,
 just summarize the various concepts that have been previously
entioned:
) Animals possess a biotic substructure of which well-functioning
is required for health and well-being. This implies that basic
needs of animals with respect to food, drink, fresh air, shelter
and movement must be provided for, as well as veterinary care
in the event of disease.
) Animals are sensitively qualiﬁed beings, implying that they are
able to suffer. Even though we cannot know how animals ‘expe-
rience’ or ‘interpret’ suffering, from their behavior we can infer
that they attempt to avoid pain and other conditions that are
disagreeable.
) Animals demonstrate the capacity of ‘inwardness’ related to
their central nervous system. This signiﬁes that they exhibit a
varying degree of agency in interacting with their environment
[35]. Related to this inwardness and agency, higher mammals, in
particular those being kept in animal husbandry, portray individ-
uality. From my  own experience with various races of ponies, I
know that, in addition to race-speciﬁc traits, these animals depict
an individual character, e.g. degree of curiosity, ability to learn a
certain behavior, and friendliness. I agree with Harfeld that it is
useful to recognize that animals have a speciﬁc nature, a telos,
which has implications for the way they are treated [23].This perception of animals implies that they cannot be treated as
ust production factors for human use but also possess an intrinsic
5 This concept is related to the notion of ‘power of judgement’ (Urteilskraft), but
 follow here, as in earlier work, an Aristotelian approach rather than a Kantian.l of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 55– 63
value.6 [60,65]. In other words, animals are an end-in-themselves;
their good matters for its own  sake [18].
The question of what this means for the manner in which we
deal with animals leads to the teleological perspective. The telos
of the practices of animal husbandry is the production of food and
ﬁber for human use which is intended to provide a justiﬁcation
for those practices. However, the ethical requirement of ‘care’ for
animals implies restrictions on the way animals should be kept.
Because they have intrinsic value, the way they are kept and treated
should maintain a degree of welfare for the animals.
5.2. View of animal welfare
In addition to the ‘intrinsic value’ of animals, animal welfare is
a major issue in animal ethics, and, just as with intrinsic value, it
is intensively debated [10,38,61–66]. In the discussions and pol-
icy making on animal welfare, the so-called ‘ﬁve freedoms’ played
a signiﬁcant role, and they still do [13,67,68]. The ﬁve freedoms
include:
(i) Freedom from thirst, hunger, and malnutrition - by ready access
to fresh water and a diet to maintain full health and vigour;
ii) Freedom from discomfort - by providing an appropriate envi-
ronment including shelter and a comfortable resting area;
iii) Freedom from pain, injury or disease - by prevention or rapid
diagnosis and treatment;
iv) Freedom to express normal behavior - by providing sufﬁcient
space, proper facilities, and company of the animal’s own kind;
(v) Freedom from fear and distress - by ensuring conditions and
treatment which avoid mental suffering.
These ﬁve freedoms encapsulate normative principles for keep-
ing animals; however, substantial segments of the current intensive
animal production systems still do not observe these freedoms [52].
Granting that the ﬁve freedoms play a signiﬁcant role, by now, the
underlying conception of animals is disputed, to say the least. The
advances in animal ethics have led to an increased nuanced picture
of animal welfare. Approximately three conceptions of animal wel-
fare are distinguished in literature that correspond to three types
of theories about animals. These are very brieﬂy summarized in the
following information [22,63,69–71].
The ﬁrst conception is presented in the ‘biological functioning
approach’ which emphasizes that animal welfare is related to bio-
logical functioning, implying that their (biological) needs should
be fulﬁlled. Care in this context denotes that animals receive
sufﬁcient food of the correct type, water, adequate housing and, if
necessary, veterinary care. The second conception of animal wel-
fare, indicated as the ‘subjective experience approach’, pertains to
the observation that animals have the ability to suffer but should,
at least, be protected from suffering and, rather, be provided the
opportunity for positive experiences. In this approach, some distin-
guish between the ‘satisfaction of preferences’ which presupposes
that animals have at least some choices and will choose what suits
them best and ‘the experience of pleasure’ that concentrates on
the feelings under certain conditions. However, since it is unlikely
that animals are able to foresee what behavior will give them most
pleasure, in the long run, these two  conceptions may  clash as an
animal may  choose to satisfy a preference that, in the long run, willwelfare is the ‘natural living approach’ in which it is stressed that
animals possess a certain ‘innate nature’ that corresponds to a
6 It is enshrined in the recent Animals Act that deﬁnes it as: A¨cknowledgement of
the intrinsic value of the animal is understood as the acknowledgement that animals
have a value of their own as beings with feeling.” [13].
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ange of speciﬁc patterns of behavior; e.g. chickens should be able
o take a sand bath [23]. However, it is debated whether animals
o have a more or less ﬁxed nature or telos.
These conceptions can conﬂict with one another. For example,
n aspect of natural living for horses is that, within a group, one is
he leader; sometimes that leads to conﬂicts that may  injure the
nimals (conﬂict with prevention of suffering and good health).
et, I believe that, in a way, these conceptions can and should all
e taken into consideration to obtain a comprehensive account
f animal welfare. The earlier given model of animals combined
ith systems theoretical notions may  be of assistance in accom-
lishing this [27]. The biological functioning approach corresponds
rimarily to the biotic substructure of animals; the subjective expe-
ience approach relates primarily to the sensitive substructure;
he ‘inwardness’ of animals, manifested, in a way, by their spe-
iﬁc nature (cf. species identity mentioned above) corresponds to
he ‘natural living’ approach. Between the substructures there are
op-down and bottom-up interactions. The lower substructures
physico-chemical and biotic) provide physical and physiological
oundary conditions for the higher sensitive substructure and for
he animal as a whole. This indicates that the well-functioning of
he animal as a sensitively qualiﬁed entity depends on the well-
unctioning of those lower substructures. On the other hand, a
ell-functioning sensitive substructure with the CNS as its cen-
er and manifesting itself in the concept of inwardness guides and
pens up the functioning of lower substructures. Stated differently,
he lower substructures are made subservient to the functioning of
he animal as a whole.
For a normative view on animal welfare, this signiﬁes that
he biological functioning and the feelings of animals do provide
oundary conditions for what can be done to animals but that they
o not, in themselves, provide absolute criteria. Some degree of
xperiencing hunger, stress or pain, e.g. muscular pain after exten-
ive training or pain from a ﬁght for the leadership of the group, is
ermitted and not just as a concession but as part of a good life of
hich a certain degree of those experiences form a ‘normal’ part (cf.
he natural living conception of welfare). Hence, to the degree that
he three presented models regarding animal welfare are consid-
red advantageous (see below), the ‘normal living approach’ should
e leading, whereby, the other approaches indicate boundary con-
itions.
This integrated concept of animal welfare, though still very
rude, corresponds better to recent developments in conceptual-
zing animal welfare [72,73]. This more recent concept, in which
llostasis is the core, distances itself from the rather abstract mod-
ls presented above and is more strongly rooted in scientiﬁc data
n animals. Essential elements of this concept of animal welfare are
72,p.427]:
 Stability through change (allostasis) and capacity to change are
crucial to enhanced health and good animal welfare.
 Good animal welfare is characterized by a broad predictive phys-
iological and behavioral capacity to anticipate environmental
challenges.
 Good animal welfare is guaranteed when the regulatory range of
allostatic mechanisms concurs with environmental demands.
 Some (not very low or zero) environmental changes that require
adaptations of the animal is key for good health and good animal
welfare.
 Behavior and physiology should be interpreted in terms of animal
perceptions and not exclusively in terms of human values.For ethically acceptable animal husbandry, this implies that the
elationship of the animal with its environment and the possibil-
ties of interaction and adaptation to it are crucial. For example,
o the extent that hens prefer to take a dust bath to get rid of licel of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 55– 63 61
and mites, one could argue that, when hens are free from lice and
mites, they do not need to have the opportunity to take a dust bath.
Further research may  be required to investigate the presumption,
but the example illustrates that a certain behavior is not neces-
sarily normative in itself but, instead, its normativity depends on
the role it plays in the adaptation of the animal to its situation and
environment.
5.3. View of care and related virtues
A practice of animal husbandry in which animal welfare is
sufﬁciently respected will not be achieved solely by rules and reg-
ulations. Observation of the entire constellation of principles will
require corresponding virtues in which the principles are embodied
in stable normative attitudes that guide the practitioner’s behavior.
This also applies to the principle of care. For achieving a situation in
which animals are being kept under ethically justiﬁable conditions,
farmers must develop the virtue of care and caretaking. Exploi-
ting literature, Anthony elaborated the central virtues in ‘ethics of
care’ for the ﬁeld of animal ethics [21]. Those virtues include atten-
tiveness, responsibility, competence and, responsiveness. Anthony
elaborated these virtues speciﬁcally in reference to consumers and
those who  inﬂuence the technical design of the food system. I agree
that they are crucial players for those in which these virtues are
relevant; however, I want to apply them here to those who  keep
animals for production, i.e. the farmers. Beginning with Anthony’s
article, I brieﬂy comment on each of those four virtues for animal
husbandry:
- Attentiveness: this denotes that animals are observed with an
attentive mind and a consciousness of the needs and possible
infringements on their welfare.
- Responsibility refers to the recognition that what we  observe may
require us to perform certain caretaking functions. Our ethical
stance prompts us to respond to situations in which the wel-
fare of animals is insufﬁciently respected, not only to optimize
the production of the animals but also as a precaution to their
welfare.
- Competence involves discharging one’s caring responsibilities in
ways that actually bring about good welfare for the animals that
are cared for. This requires knowledge about animals, their behav-
ior, and the ways and means to care for them. It is the technical
dimension of professionalism.
- Responsiveness pertains to the manner in which animals react
to the conditions under which they are kept and the ways they
are treated and respond to it. This also involves being alert (cf.
attentiveness) to the possibilities of negligence, abuse, or incom-
petence and acting accordingly to rectify deﬁcits.
It continues to be important that the virtues mentioned above
are promoted and acquired by all of those involved in the chain of
production of human food of animal origin.
In addition to the three theories that pertain to ethical concepts
that are important for the observation of the ethical aspect of the
practice of animal husbandry, it was  argued previously that we  also
require an understanding of phronèsis, i.e. practical wisdom, This
will be brieﬂy argued in the next section.
5.4. View of phronèsis
Strictly speaking, phronèsis is not a moral virtue but, instead, a
virtue of the intellect. The person possessing the quality of phronè-
sis will, by employing his cognitive faculties, consider the type of
action required for bringing about a certain change. So phronèsis is
not just having theoretical knowledge or even a logical mind–these
are understood - but more so possessing the correct practical sense
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f how to behave in an appropriate manner. It is a capacity to
xercise proper ‘judgment’ that is developed in performing one’s
ractice. More in general, phronèsis is the ability to discern the
xisting normativity in concrete situations and to disclose this
n the correct manner. In other words, a professional exhibiting
hronèsis is able to discern the appropriate virtues for a certain sit-
ation and subsequently determine which values, norms and rules
f a practice are to be applied, thereby determining the desired and
ndesired effects of certain decisions [74].
The views of the four concepts brieﬂy presented above all con-
ribute to an understanding of the ethical aspect of the practice
f animal husbandry that accepts animal husbandry only under
ertain circumstances.
. Concluding observations
In this article, I have presented a philosophically argued per-
pective regarding the practice of animal husbandry that, in
rinciple, accepts keeping animals for human use and also for food.
owever, at the same time, this view restricts that practice by
 constellation of normative principles among which the ethical
rinciple of care. The meaning of this ethical principle of care is
laborated in three supporting theories on animals that support the
ntrinsic value of animals, animal welfare, and the virtues that relate
o the principle of care. This approach to animal ethics provides for
n integration of a number of aspects and theories regarding eth-
cally acceptable animal husbandry into a coherent discourse. The
esulting theory is not as radical as some other theories. It is not
oo ‘soft’ to really ‘bite’ actual practice. If the approach contained
ithin this article were to be applied to current animal husbandry,
he serious ethical deﬁcit of many of those practices would become
vident, especially in intensive production systems. I recognize that
fforts are being made to improve the situation (see also reference
1). It continues to be a matter of debate whether these efforts are
ar reaching or fast enough. Hopefully, this approach will contribute
o ongoing improvements of the way animals are being treated in
nimal husbandry.
By employing the concept of normative practices, it is apparent
hat a normative evaluation of practices such as animal husbandry
annot be restricted to an application of a few ethical principles. The
ractice is embedded in the wider physical, biotic, and societal envi-
onment which signiﬁes that it is subjected to constraints imposed
y the just-mentioned normative principles. At the same time, we
aw that those constraints are related to institutional and legisla-
ive contexts that make proper functioning of the practice possible
t all. This emphasizes that the constraints embody principles, for
xample, related to environmental legislation or rules regarding
he keeping of animals, that should not just be perceived as external
estrictions but, instead, as constitutive for the practice; it consists
n acting according to those principles. It will be clear that only if the
nstitutional context enables and stimulates the individual practi-
ioner will a satisfactory observation of all the principles, including
he ethical, be obtained. A precondition for this is the political will
o make the required transition. At this level of the implementation
f legal demands on practices of animal husbandry, the principle
f global justice and, hence, the social implications for all of the
takeholders on a global level should also be respected.
It has also been argued here that the understanding of what is
n ethically warranted performance of the practice of animal hus-
andry will always be inﬂuenced by fundamental concepts of the
haracter of reality, the status of animals, the purpose of practice,
tc. It is recommended, therefore, that in the ongoing debate on a
areful animal husbandry, everyone is allowed to draw on one’s
wn sources of meaning and morality while, at the same time,
veryone may  be asked to explain one’s position in terms that are
[
[l of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 55– 63
generally understandable. Such a debate among all stakeholders
will be required to sustain policy-making aiming at the transition
described above.
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